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New York Times v. Sullivan and the Rhetorics of Race:
A Look at the Briefs, Oral Arguments, and Opinions
CARLO A. PEDRIOLI*
This crisis was created when the aspirations of the Negroes were met “with tena-
cious and determined resistance” by “the guardians of the status quo,” which
“resistance grows out of the desperate attempt of the White South to perpetuate a
system of human values that came into being under a feudalistic plantation system
which cannot survive” today.1
I. INTRODUCTION
New York Times v. Sullivan2 is one of the most significant First Amendment cases
that the United States Supreme Court decided in the twentieth century.3 In Sullivan,
a libel suit by a public official against the New York Times and four clergymen,4 the
U.S. Supreme Court placed the First Amendment on top of centuries of British libel
law. After the Sullivan decision, a public official who sued for libel had to make more
than a common law case for libel; the plaintiff also had to show actual malice, which
the Court defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.5
The importance of the Sullivan doctrine of actual malice, which “revolutionized
libel law,”6 would be hard to overstate. With Sullivan on the books, government
officials had a much higher standard to meet when suing their critics, including those
in the news media. The purpose of elevating the standard was to give greater protec-
* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University. J.D., University of the Pacific, 2002; Ph.D., Communica-
tion, University of Utah, 2005; Member, State Bar of California. For comments on a prior version of this
Article, the author thanks Brian K. Landsberg. The author presented an earlier version of this Article at the
Central States Law Schools Association Annual Scholarship Conference at the Louisiana State University Law
Center on October 11, 2014. © 2014, Carlo A. Pedrioli.
1. Brief for Petitioners at 19, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 40) (quoting MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 155, 156, 158 (1958)).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme Court issued one opinion for both Sullivan and the companion case
of Abernathy v. Sullivan, Numbers 39 and 40 respectively on the Court’s docket. Id.
3. Many scholars have discussed the importance of the case. For example, only a few years after the
Supreme Court decided Sullivan, one commentator described the opinion as “a landmark decision.” THOMAS
I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 524 (1970). More recently, another observer charac-
terized the case as “the most important libel opinion ever written” and perhaps “the most important free-
expression opinion in U.S. jurisprudence.” W. WAT HOPKINS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 83 (1991). An additional commentator called the case “one of the greatest cases of modern free
speech law.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 38 (1995). Yet another
observer described the case as “this nation’s greatest constitutional pronouncement on the law of political
libel” and the opinion by Justice William Brennan as “Brennan’s most important contribution to constitu-
tional law up to that time.” Kermit L. Hall, “Lies, Lies, Lies”: The Origins of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9
COMM. L. & POL’Y 391, 391 (2004).
4. 376 U.S. at 256.
5. Id. at 279-80. The common law traditionally had favored plaintiffs in libel suits, including those suits
that government officials brought. W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER TIMES V.
SULLIVAN 6 (1989).
6. Susan Dente Ross & R. Kenton Bird, The Ad That Changed Libel Law: Judicial Realism and Social
Activism in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 489, 490 (2004).
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tion to speech, including speech in the press, that was critical of the government.7
Such speech related to self-governance captured “the central meaning of the First
Amendment.”8 The case provided substantial space for seditious libel, which had
been punishable under British law and later in the young United States under the
Sedition Act of 1798.9 In the years after Sullivan, the Court expanded the rule of
actual malice to a variety of situations.10
Despite the importance of the doctrine of actual malice, particularly in a represen-
tative democracy, the case, including the Supreme Court’s decision, did not happen
in a vacuum.11 The plaintiff, Lester Bruce Sullivan, was White and a commissioner
in Montgomery, Alabama, and the four individual defendants were Black minis-
ters.12 Shortly before the allegedly libelous advertisement was published in late March
1960, the sit-in movement, which had been spreading throughout the South, arrived
in Montgomery.13 On February 25, 1960, thirty-five students from Alabama State
College, a segregated public institution of higher learning for African-Americans,
requested service at the snack bar located in the basement of the Montgomery
County Courthouse, and authorities arrested the students for this action.14 The next
day, Governor John Patterson demanded that the students be expelled from school
for their conduct.15 One day later, almost all of the students at Alabama State
College marched to the state capitol to protest the recent events.16 When members of
the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) attacked the student protesters with bats, state and local
authorities stood by idly.17 The KKK members were not punished for their attack.18
On March 5, 1960, Sullivan issued a statement regarding public assembly in
Montgomery. In the statement, Sullivan called those who wanted to assemble at the
state capitol building the next Sunday “the Negro troublemakers” who sought “to
further incite the tense situation that exist[ed] in Montgomery.”19 He accused those
who wanted to assemble of “flaunting their arrogance and defiance.”20 Sullivan
7. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment”, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208-10.
8. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273. See also Kalven, supra note 7, at 208-10.
9. See Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 948 (1919); Act of July
14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
10. See W. Wat Hopkins, Editor’s Note, COMM. L. & POL’Y 387, 389 (2004).
11. See Ross & Bird, supra note 6, at 522. Of note, a rhetorical culture, including its legal branch, evolves
through adaptation “to changing social, political, and economic exigencies.” Marouf Hasian, Jr., Celeste
Michelle Condit & John Louis Lucaites, The Rhetorical Boundaries of ‘the Law’: A Consideration of the
Rhetorical Culture of Legal Practice and the Case of the ‘Separate But Equal’ Doctrine, 82 Q. J. SPEECH 323, 327
(1996) (commenting that the process of change is organic).
12. KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW,
AND THE FREE PRESS 11 (2011); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.






19. L. B. Sullivan, Statement, ALA. TEXTUAL MAT’L COLLECTION (Mar. 5, 1960), http://digital.archives.
alabama.gov/cdm/singleitem/collection/voices/id/3445/rec/4.
20. Id.
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assured his audience, “[W]e have no intention whatsoever of permitting our city to
be used as a site for the racial agitators and prejudiced Northern press to further their
program of racial strife and exploitation for financial gain and spectacularly distorted
news coverage.”21 He closed by noting that any resistance would “be dealt with
according to law.”22 Presumably, the operative law that Sullivan mentioned was not
that of the U.S. Constitution, but the law of Alabama.
Given the strife of the Civil Rights Movement that surrounded the case, this
Article looks back at the use of race in New York Times v. Sullivan.23 Specifically, the
Article examines how the advocates, led by Herbert Wechsler for the Times, I. H.
Wachtel, William Rogers, and Samuel Pierce for the four ministers, and Roland
Nachman for Sullivan, dealt with race in their rhetorics to the Court, both in their
merits briefs and their oral arguments,24 and also how the justices used race in their
opinions. Although Justice William Brennan did not explicitly focus on race in his
opinion for the Court, the racial context that framed the case was hard to ignore, and
Brennan, in ultimately resolving the case without remanding it to the Alabama
courts for further proceedings, did not completely ignore race. Additionally, Justice
Hugo Black, a native of Alabama,25 discussed race explicitly and at more length in his
concurring opinion, and Justice Arthur Goldberg briefly mentioned race.
To further the proposed discussion, the Article initially will sketch out a brief
definition of race. Then the Article will provide some background on the Sullivan
case before it arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court. Next, the Article will discuss the
nature of the Supreme Court as an audience for the lawyers who advocated for the
various parties in the case. After discussing the judicial audience, the Article will
address how the various advocates used or declined to use race in their merits briefs
and oral arguments. Finally, the Article will look at how the justices considered race
in their opinions. The Article should provide a better understanding of some of the
rhetorical choices that may be available to legal advocates and members of the bench
regarding complex topics like race.
II. A BRIEF NOTE ON RACE
The word race is a complicated term to define.26 Historically, the term had a
biological referent, but support for a biological view of race declined in the early
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Other foci of study beyond the doctrinal and civil rights components of Sullivan are possible. For a
study of judicial philosophy and Sullivan, see Carlo A. Pedrioli, A Key Influence on the Doctrine of Actual
Malice: Justice William Brennan’s Judicial Philosophy at Work in Changing the Law of Seditious Libel, 9
COMM. LAW & POL’Y 567 (2004).
24. The merits briefs and oral arguments represented the heart of advocacy in the case. Amicus curiae
briefs came from the ACLU, the Chicago Tribune, and the Washington Post. See HALL & UROFSKY, supra note
12, at 134-36.
25. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 150 (1991).
26. A. Cheree Carlson, “You Know It When You See It”: The Rhetorical Hierarchy of Race and Gender in
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 85 Q. J. SPEECH 111, 111 (1999). For a discussion of the terms race and
ethnicity, including how the two terms converge and diverge, see Carlo A. Pedrioli, Respecting Language As Part
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twentieth century.27 From more contemporary social construction perspectives,
race can be viewed as “a complex of social and economic relationships”28 and
“‘social value become perception.’”29 Race, a “taken-for-granted structural forma-
tion[ ] . . . personally lived and experienced by everyday social actors,”30 can be “‘a site
of struggle.’”31 The meaning of race often depends on historical conditions,32 and as
racial categories change over time,33 the racial landscape requires “constant attention
and monitoring.”34 Race can be destabilized and should be treated as a contested
object of study.35
Race functions in a variety of ways. For example, race can be used to exercise
power in a manner that promotes dominant ideologies.36 Alternatively, race can be
used to transform society through the allocation of various resources.37 Race also
can play a role in identity construction38 and help with the resistance of external
phenomena.39
In the United States, while members of minority groups generally have to deal
with race, White individuals have the choice of ignoring race.40 Such a choice is a
of Ethnicity: Title VII and Language Discrimination at Work, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 97,
110-14 (2011).
27. Lisa A. Flores, The Rhetorical “Realness” of Race, or Why Critical Race Rhetoricians Need Performance
Studies, 34 TEXT & PERFORMANCE STUDS. 94, 94 (2014). See also Darlene K. Drummond & Mark P. Orbe,
Cultural Contracts: Negotiating a Ubiquitous U.S. Dominant Worldview on Race and Ethnicity, 61 COMM.
STUDS. 373, 373 (2010).
28. Carlson, supra note 26, at 111.
29. Flores, supra note 27, at 94.
30. Rona Tamiko Halualani, Deanna L. Fassett, Jennifer Huynh Thi Anh Morrison & Patrick Shaou-
Whea Dodge, Between the Structural and the Personal: Situated Sense-Makings of “Race”, 3 COMM. & CRITICAL/
CULTURAL STUDS. 70, 71 (2006) (emphasis in the original).
31. Flores, supra note 27, at 94.
32. Carlson, supra note 26, at 111.
33. Drummond & Orbe, supra note 27, at 373-74. For example, in the first U.S. census, which Thomas
Jefferson supervised, the three racial categories included were free Whites, slaves, and other free persons. Id. at
374. Subcategories for the third category included free Blacks and “taxable Indians.” Id. Over two hundred
years later, in the 2000 census, the six racial categories included were White, Black/African-American,
American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian-American, Pacific Islander, and Some Other Race. Id.
34. Lisa A. Flores, Dreama G. Moon & Thomas K. Nakayama, Dynamic Rhetorics of Race: California’s
Racial Privacy Initiative and the Shifting Grounds of Racial Politics, 3 COMM. & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUDS.
181, 183 (2006).
35. Carlson, supra note 26, at 126.
36. Halualani et al., supra note 30, at 89. Because of the way that race can be used negatively, discussions of
race, like discussions of other rhetorical phenomena conducted by critical studies scholars, often end with
depressing critiques of discourse. However, this type of conclusion to the discussion does not always have to
result because communication is not always a negative phenomenon; critics can offer suggestions for improve-
ment. See Identifying Key Intercultural Urgencies, Issues, and Challenges in Today’s World: Connecting Our
Scholarship to Dynamic Contexts and Historical Moments, 7 J. INT’L. & INTERCULTURAL COMM. 38, 62 (2014)
(comments of Jing Yin).
37. Brenda J. Allen, Theorizing Communication and Race, 74 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 259, 259 (2007).
38. Halualani et al., supra note 30, at 90. Some individuals seem able to transcend race.
See Christopher B. Brown, Barack Obama as the Great Man: Communicative Constructions of Racial Transcen-
dence in White-Male Elite Discourses, 78 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 535, 539 (2011). Prominent examples of such
race-transcendent individuals include Oprah Winfrey, Colin Powell, Bill Cosby, and Michael Jordan. Id.
39. Halualani et al., supra note 30, at 90.
40. Allen, supra note 37, at 260.
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privilege that comes with being White.41 From a self-reflective White perspective,
this White privilege is “‘an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on
cashing in each day, but about which I was “meant” to remain oblivious.’”42 White
privilege derives from Whiteness, which works “as an invisible, uninterrogated, non-
particular, and universalizing background against which all ‘others’ are racialized.”43
Of particular note to this Article, White privilege plays a role in the judicial context,
where the system often functions to maintain power for elite Whites.44
III. BACKGROUND ON THE SULLIVAN CASE BEFORE IT REACHED THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT
In the early 1960s, Lester Bruce Sullivan was one of three city commissioners in
Montgomery, Alabama.45 He sued the New York Times and four African-American
ministers, Ralph D. Abernathy, Fred L. Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay, Sr., and J. E.
Lowery,46 for libel based on a full-page advertisement that appeared in the Times on
March 29, 1960.47 A jury awarded Sullivan a $500,000 verdict, and the Alabama
Supreme Court upheld the verdict.48
The advertisement was entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”49 According to the
advertisement, the purpose of the document was to support the student movement,
the movement for voting rights, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was facing a
perjury indictment in Montgomery.50 The Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South (“Committee”) sponsored and
created the advertisement.51 The names of many individuals, including the four
individual defendants, appeared on the advertisement, presumably to endorse the
41. Id.
42. Aaron Hess & Miriam Sobre-Denton, Setting Aside the “Wise Latina?”: Postracial Myths, Paradoxes, and
Performing Enculturation in the Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, 65 COMM. STUDS. 1, 3 (2014).
43. Meryl J. Irwin, “Their Experience is the Immigrant Experience”: Ellis Island, Documentary Film, and
Rhetorically Reversible Whiteness, 99 Q. J. SPEECH 74, 81 (2013) (noting that Whiteness “seems forever to
escape having its substance captured and described”).
44. Hess & Sobre-Denton, supra note 42, at 4 (noting that, in the United States, White privilege often
intersects with nationalism and, in turn, objectivity). See also IAN HANEY LO´PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 7-8 (2006).
45. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 11; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
Sullivan had won a position as a city commissioner the year before. Susan Lindley Smith, Casual Conversation
or Constitutional Conspiracy: Controverting the Origins of New York Times v. Sullivan, 42 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 1,
4 (2005). In campaigning for reelection in 1963, Sullivan ran on a segregation platform. Id. at 6.
46. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 51.
47. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. Although this particular item was a paid advertisement, the Times had
“devote[d] considerable resources to covering the civil rights movement in the South,” which had elevated the
movement to the level of national news. Ross & Bird, supra note 6, at 497.
48. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
49. Id. “Heed Their Rising Voices” was one of at least fourteen pro-civil rights advertisements that various
civil rights groups placed in the Times between 1945 and 1964. Ross & Bird, supra note 6, at 492.
50. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257.
51. Id.
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message.52 Among the names on the list were those of Eleanor Roosevelt and Jackie
Robinson.53
Although materially accurate in describing the struggle for civil rights in Montgom-
ery, the advertisement contained several factual errors in paragraphs three and six.54
For example, the students that assembled on the steps of the Alabama state capitol
had sung “The Star Spangled Banner,” not “My Country, ’Tis of Thee.”55 The
campus dining hall at Alabama State College had never been padlocked, and the
police had never surrounded the campus.56 Dr. King had been arrested four times,
not seven.57
The connection between the advertisement and Sullivan was tenuous, and the
negative impact of the advertisement was dubious. Nowhere did the advertisement
mention Sullivan by name.58 Rather, the advertisement referenced the “‘police.’”59
However, Sullivan noted that one of his duties as commissioner included supervision
of the police department.60 Additionally, Sullivan did not demonstrate any pecuni-
ary loss due to the allegedly libelous statements.61 Of note, the circulation of the
Times in Alabama was about 394, and only 35 copies were circulated in Montgomery
County.62
For $4,800, the Times had accepted the advertisement from a New York advertis-
ing agency that worked on the Committee’s behalf.63 Along with the advertisement,
the Times received a letter from A. Philip Randolph, the chairperson of the Commit-
tee, which certified that the individuals had authorized the use of their names for the
advertisement.64 The editors at the Times knew that Randolph was responsible and
accepted the advertisement pursuant to standard practices.65 However, no one at the
Times made an effort to confirm whether the advertisement was accurate, and, as it
turned out, none of the four individual defendants had authorized the use of his
name in the advertisement or had known about the advertisement in advance of its
publication.66
The trial judge, Judge Walter Jones,67 informed the jury that the material in the
advertisement was libelous per se and not privileged, so the jury only needed to find
52. Id.
53. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 7.
54. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257-58.
55. Id. at 258-59.
56. Id. at 259.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 258.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 260.
62. Id. at 260 n.3. The entire daily circulation of the Times for March 29, 1960, was about 650,000
copies. Id.
63. Id. at 260.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 260-61.
67. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 48. Judge Jones was “a devotee of the Confederacy,” and his father
had fought in the Confederate army. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 25. Jones was also opposed to the Civil Rights
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that the defendants had published the advertisement and that the advertisement was
of and concerning Sullivan.68 Further, Jones instructed the jury that injury was
implied, and that falsity and malice were presumed.69 Moreover, Sullivan did not
have to show or even allege general damages, and, as a result, the jury could opt to
award punitive damages.70
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.71 In the process of doing so,
the state’s highest court upheld the trial court’s rulings and jury instructions.72 The
Alabama Supreme Court also briefly rejected the idea that the First Amendment,
operative through the Fourteenth Amendment, protected the speech in the advertise-
ment.73 “The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous
publications,” the Alabama Supreme Court opined.74
IV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AS AUDIENCE
Audience, or “the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his
argumentation,”75 is a key component in the process of persuasion. The skillful
communicator must adapt rhetorically to the audience in the given rhetorical situa-
tion.76 Knowing the views of the audience, including the values that the audience
holds, is critical to such adaptation.77 When contrasted with general audiences,
audiences like the U.S. Supreme Court are specialized in nature because they exist
within specific disciplines.78
During the 1963 term, when Sullivan was argued, the members of the U.S.
Supreme Court included Earl Warren, Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, Tom C.
Clark, John M. Harlan, William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, and
Arthur J. Goldberg, all of whom were White.79 This membership, which embodied
Movement. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 49. For instance, he had prohibited Freedom Riders from
demonstrating against a segregated busing system, stopped the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (“NAACP”) from conducting business in Alabama, and kept the U.S. Department of Justice
from reviewing voter registration records in Alabama counties. Id. Seating in his courtroom was segregated.
Id. Nonetheless, Jones knew the law of libel and “had a reputation for running a strict courtroom.” Id.
68. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 262.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 263.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 264.
74. New York Times v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 676 (1962).
75. CHAI¨M PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE IN ARGUMENTA-
TION 19 (1969).
76. CHAI¨IM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 13 (1982); Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1
PHIL. & RHETORIC 1 (1968). For a critique of Bitzer’s argument, see Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the
Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154 (1973).
77. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 75, at 23-24; Malcolm O. Sillars, Audiences, Social
Values, and The Analysis of Argument, 22 THE SPEECH TEACHER 291, 299 (1973).
78. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 75, at 99-100.
79. Warren Court (1962-1965), THE OYEZ PROJECT, http://www.oyez.org/courts/warren/war7 (last vis-
ited Dec. 8, 2014).
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Whiteness on the bench,80 had changed somewhat over the years since the beginning
of the Warren Court in 1953.81 Nonetheless, the same chief justice had presided over
the Court for the past decade, and other key members like Justices Black and Doug-
las were constants.
During the decade before Sullivan, the Court as an audience was open to, al-
though cautious about, addressing the topic of race in a manner favorable to minori-
ties who sought true equal protection under the law.82 Prior to Sullivan, the Court
had issued several major decisions on race. For instance, in 1954, the Court decided
the famous Brown v. Board of Education 83 case, announcing, in the words of Chief
Justice Warren, “We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal.”84 Such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.85 Brown included the following three state companion cases: Briggs v.
80. See Hess & Sobre-Denton, supra note 42, at 4 (describing the Supreme Court “as a location that
centers whiteness”). The Court was entirely White until 1967, when Thurgood Marshall, an African-
American and an appointee of President Lyndon Johnson, replaced Tom Clark. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER
CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 678 (1983). Marshall had
worked at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for over two decades and had been chief counsel in the Brown
case. Id.
81. For example, the composition of the Court during the 1953 term included Earl Warren, Hugo L.
Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, Robert H. Jackson, Harold Burton, Tom C.
Clark, and Sherman Minton. Warren Court (1953-1954), THE OYEZ PROJECT, http://www.oyez.org/courts/
warren/war1 (last visited Dec. 8, 2014).
The response to Earl Warren’s appointment as chief justice was not entirely favorable. Warren, then the
governor of California, had spent his career in public life, but he had no judicial experience. RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 666 (2d ed. 2004). Felix Frankfurter was allegedly outraged that Eisenhower would appoint a
politician to the position. Id. at 667. One commentator expressed the belief that “‘a first-rate appointment’”
might have helped the country forget the low-quality appointments that President Harry Truman had made
in recent years. Id.
Regardless, Justices Harold Burton and Robert Jackson agreed that Warren would be “the most logical
candidate.” Id. at 660. Moreover, Eisenhower had met Warren at the 1952 Republican convention and
generally admired the man’s lengthy public record. Id. at 666. Thus, in September 1953, shortly after the
death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson, Attorney General Herbert Brownell flew to California to see if Warren
would be open to a sudden move from Sacramento to Washington, DC. Id. at 659, 666.
Since Congress was not in session, the appointment had to be a recess appointment. Id. at 667. On March
1, 1954, the Senate confirmed Warren for a permanent position, and no senator voted against the chief
justice. Id. at 696. Meanwhile, Warren “had won the admiration of his brethren for traits of character if not
breathtaking legal acumen.” Id. For instance, Warren proved to be good at listening and also at asking
questions during oral argument. Id. at 697.
82. Actually, the Court’s openness to discussing race in a positive way for minorities had begun before Earl
Warren had assumed his position as chief justice in 1953. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(deciding that courts could not enforce racially restrictive covenants); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
(holding that the University of Texas Law School had to admit a Black student because the state’s newly-
created law school for Blacks was not the equivalent of the law school at Texas); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that the University of Oklahoma could not require a student to use
only designated facilities on campus because of his race).
83. 347 U.S. 483.
84. Id. at 495. To send a strong message, Warren wanted to avoid a divided Court and eventually
produced a unanimous one. KLUGER, supra note 81, at 682-83, 711-12.
85. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. For a discussion of how Black and White interests converged in Brown, see
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR
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Elliott, Davis v. County School Board, and Gebhart v. Belton.86 In the federal compan-
ion case of Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court held that racially segregated schools in the
District of Columbia violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.87
The Court followed these pronouncements with another major case favorable to
those who supported the idea of racial equality. In 1958, when the governor and
legislature in Arkansas attempted to prevent desegregation of the public schools in
Little Rock, the Court, in Cooper v. Aaron,88 called upon Brown and reminded the
Arkansas officials that, under the Supremacy Clause in the federal Constitution,89
the Constitution was the supreme law of the land.90 Since segregated schools violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the public schools in
Arkansas had to be desegregated.91
Despite these major judicial statements in favor of civil rights, the Court exhibited
a good degree of caution on the topic of race. In 1955, the Court discussed remedies
for school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education II,92 but the Court offered only
generalities and left the lower courts, including those in the South, to work out the
details of the remedies.93 Thereafter, other than in Cooper, the justices denied full
review to further school desegregation cases until 1963.94 Particularly on school
desegregation, the justices may have been waiting for some support from the other
two branches of the federal government.95 For the most part, that support was not
immediate.96 For example, Republican President Dwight Eisenhower avoided endors-
ing the Brown decision.97 In 1956, Democratic contenders for the presidency did not
offer much more support for the decision, and neither did Congress.98
In the years after the original Brown v. Board of Education case, the Court did
extend Brown to other areas, but only in a weak manner. For instance, the Court
RACIAL REFORM 59-68 (2004). See also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
86. The four state cases were Numbers 1, 2, 4, and 10. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
87. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). In Bolling, Chief Justice Warren wrote, “In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.” Id.
88. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
89. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
90. 358 U.S. at 17-18.
91. Id. at 18-20.
92. 349 U.S. 294.
93. Id. at 299-300. Brown and Brown II did not have an immediate effect on desegregation in the South. A
decade after Brown, among the eleven states in the old Confederacy, 1.17% of Black students attended school
with White students. BELL, supra note 85, at 96. When school districts would not desegregate, Black parents
had to obtain court orders, and many parents lacked the funds to bring lawsuits. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 351-52
(2004). Also, many federal judges in the South did not support Brown. Id. at 354-56. In light of the vague
guidelines in Brown II, one could describe the sequel case as “a solid victory for white southerners.” Id. at 318.




98. Id. at 325.
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struck down government discrimination in public beaches and bathhouses,99 public
golf courses,100 public buses,101 and public parks.102 However, rather than offering
reasoned elaborations on why the government discrimination violated the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court in all of these cases merely issued one-sentence opin-
ions that announced the results. While this approach might have been progress, the
approach hardly constituted robust enforcement of minority rights.
Nonetheless, during the early 1960s, the Court became more involved in address-
ing racial issues in a robust manner. In the area of voting rights, the Court issued its
decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot in 1960 and struck down the boundaries of
Tuskegee, Alabama, which were drawn in a twenty-eight sided figure to disenfran-
chise Black citizens, as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.103 During the 1961
and 1962 terms, the Court decided several sit-in cases in favor of the protesters who
had objected when proprietors of lunch counters across the South had refused to
provide service to African-American patrons.104 In looking for a legal justification,
the Court struggled with the “No state shall” language in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment105 because the action in the sit-in cases was primarily private.106 During the
1963 term, several more sit-in cases were on the Court’s docket, as was the Sullivan
case.107
V. RACE IN THE ADVOCATES’ RHETORICS
As this section of the Article will show, the legal advocates used race in different
ways in their briefs and during oral arguments. Counsel for the Times did not make
much use of race, instead choosing to focus more on the free speech and press issues
in the case. Counsel for the ministers, on the other hand, focused heavily on race,
highlighting the racial problems not only with the trial, but also with Southern
society. Meanwhile, counsel for Sullivan attempted to deflect any serious discussion
of race, frequently employing legal technicalities to avoid the subject matter.
99. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), affirming per curiam Dawson v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
100. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), reversing per curiam Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223
F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955).
101. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming per curiam Browder v. Gayle, 252 F.2d 122 (M.D.
Ala. 1956); Holmes, 350 U.S. at 879.
102. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958), affirming per curiam
New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958).
103. 364 U.S. 339.
104. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 216-17 (2010).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
106. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 104, at 217. The problem of needing state action to firmly justify a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was resolved when, after a fifty-seven day filibuster in the Senate,
Congress finally passed and Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act banned, among
other action, discrimination in public accommodations. Id. at 219-20.
107. Id. at 217.
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A. Race and the Advocacy for the Times
The Brief for the Petitioners in Number 39 listed Herbert Brownell, Thomas F.
Daly, and Herbert Wechsler as the attorneys for the New York Times.108 Listed as of
counsel were Louis M. Loeb, T. Eric Embry, Marvin E. Frankel, Ronald S. Diana,
and Doris Wechsler.109 At this stage, Herbert Wechsler, a professor at Columbia
Law School and a veteran of a dozen arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, was
in charge of the advocacy for the Times.110 Wechsler had a reputation for original
thinking.111 Embry had been counsel for the Times during both the trial and the
appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court,112 but Wechsler presented oral argument
before the U.S. Supreme Court.113
In the brief, Wechsler and his colleagues did not make much of race. Because they
offered a description of the advertisement and its factual errors, Wechsler and his
fellow attorneys necessarily had to discuss various aspects of the Civil Rights Move-
ment that the advertisement referenced.114 In the brief’s appendix, counsel included
a copy of the advertisement, which presented various aspects of the struggle for civil
rights in the South.115 Despite these references, the attorneys focused on other
matters. Specifically, counsel claimed the Alabama courts’ actions had violated the
freedom of the press. Counsel argued that, in the interest of promoting democratic
discourse, the Constitution should protect criticism of government.116 This argu-
ment embraced “the central meaning of the First Amendment,” an idea supposedly
learned in the wake of the Sedition Act of 1798.117 Counsel added that nothing in
the evidence supported a finding of injury to Sullivan’s reputation and that the jury
award was excessive.118 Eventually, counsel contended the Times lacked suitable
contacts with Alabama to justify jurisdiction.119
During oral argument,120 Wechsler took similar positions, again focusing on the
First Amendment and not developing the racial dimension of the case. In a grand
manner, he claimed that the Alabama courts’ action posed “hazards to the freedom of
108. Brief for Petitioner at cover, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39).
109. Id.
110. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 120-21. Wechsler had a reputation for expertise in the area of
federalism, which proved appropriate for Sullivan. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 104.
111. CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT: A HISTORY OF THE
FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 213 (2007). One law school colleague said of Wechsler, “‘He’s the kind
of person who takes a thought wherever it leads him, refusing to be deflected by where it is going.’” Id.
112. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 46-47, 93. Embry was elected to the Alabama Supreme Court in
1975. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 44.
113. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 148.
114. Brief for Petitioner at 4-10, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39).
115. Id. at app. B1-B3.
116. Id. at 41-43, 45-46.
117. Id. at 45-48. See also Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
118. Brief for Petitioner at 58-59, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39).
119. Id. at 77-79.
120. Martin Luther King, Jr., was a spectator during oral argument. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 104,
at 222. His presence likely contrasted with, and perhaps problematized, the Whiteness of the bench.
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the press of a dimension not confronted since the early days [of] the Republic.”121
Once more, he addressed the criticism of officials’ conduct and used the Sedition Act
of 1798 to illustrate what could happen without a robust First Amendment.122 The
advocate also addressed the size of the jury award.123
That Wechsler and his colleagues did not make much of the racial dimension of
the case may be understandable. Their client was a corporation from New York City,
as opposed to a member of a minority group who had suffered racial discrimination
by the government, and counsel had plenty to say about the First Amendment. Still,
because the Sullivan case developed from the Civil Rights Movement, during which
the Supreme Court had decided several cases in favor of pro-civil rights forces, a
reasonable attorney could have thought that the Court would be open to arguments
that considered the racial dimension of the case. Of course, the Court had been
cautious on the race issue since Brown, and Wechsler, as a veteran Supreme Court
advocate and seasoned law professor, was likely familiar with the Court’s caution.
B. Race and the Advocacy for the Ministers
The Brief for the Petitioners in Number 40 listed I. H. Wachtel, Charles S.
Conley, Benjamin Spiegel, and Raymond S. Harris as attorneys for the four Black
ministers.124 Listed as of counsel were Harry H. Wachtel, Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.,
Joseph B. Russell, David N. Brainin, Stephen J. Jelin, Clarence B. Jones, David G.
Lubell, and Charles B. Markham.125 Samuel R. Pierce and William Rogers, the latter
of whom had written an amicus brief in the case for the Washington Post, presented
oral argument before the Supreme Court.126
In the brief, counsel for the four ministers focused much more extensively on race
than Wechsler and his colleagues had in their rhetoric, although this was not the only
type of argument made for the ministers. Like Wechsler and his fellow attorneys,
counsel for the ministers described the advertisement as an aspect of the Civil Rights
Movement.127 Additionally, counsel developed First Amendment arguments similar
to those of Wechsler and his colleagues.128
However, in various places in the brief, the ministers’ counsel offered much more.
In the brief’s statement of facts, counsel drew out the racial dimensions of the case.
Counsel pointed to Alabama’s “sweeping racial segregation laws” that were operative
in Montgomery.129 Moreover, as counsel noted, the jury in the case had been en-
tirely White, and the trial judge, Judge Walter Jones, was on the jury commission in
Montgomery County that had “intentionally and systematically excluded” Blacks
121. Oral Argument at 00:29, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_39#argument.
122. Id. at 43:17.
123. Id. at 58:43.
124. Brief for Petitioners at cover, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 40).
125. Id.
126. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 158.
127. Brief for Petitioners at 6-8, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 40).
128. Id. at 30-39.
129. Id. at 12.
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from jury service.130 Further, Jones had allowed plaintiff’s counsel to make racially
charged appeals by mispronouncing the word Negro as Nigra and Nigger with the
jury present.131
In the brief’s summary of the argument, counsel picked up on similar themes,
observing the following about the case:
Clearly, when four Negro ministers are sued by a white City Commissioner for an
ad seeking support for Dr. Martin Luther King, and the case is tried in a segregated
court room in Montgomery, Alabama, during a Civil War Centennial, before an
all-white jury and a trial judge elected at polls from which Negroes were excluded,
and when that very Judge states that “white man’s justice” governs in his court and
permits respondent’s counsel to say “Nigger” and “Nigra” to the jury, then the
Fourteenth Amendment does indeed become the “pariah” that the Trial Judge
below called it.132
This discourse framed the rhetorical situation for the argument to follow.
In the argument section itself, counsel again put the racial matters before the
Court. The opening paragraph of this section framed the rhetorical situation even
more broadly by speaking of “[t]he century-long struggle of the Negro people for
complete emancipation and full citizenship,” which “ha[d] been met at each step by a
distinct pattern of resistance, with only the weapons changing, from lynching, vio-
lence and intimidation, through restrictive covenants, Black Codes, and Jim Crow
laws, to avoidance, ‘interposition,’ ‘nullification,’ tokenism and open contempt.”133
The current case was just another manifestation of the same racism.134 Indeed, the
libel suit was the latest “weapon” that Southern officials were using to restrict the
rights of Black citizens.135
Furthermore, counsel drew attention to the Brown v. Board of Education136
decision from a decade earlier and the ensuing Southern resistance, of which Ala-
bama was a leader.137 The resistance had manifested itself in a variety of areas,
including voting, jury service, and housing.138 Despite the Supreme Court’s warn-
ings, the Southern states refused to make material changes on public policies regard-
ing racial discrimination.139
In light of some of these broader historical and contemporary social concerns,
counsel for the ministers developed the argument about racism with reference to the
specifics of the trial below. In an observation similar to one in the summary of the
argument, counsel noted the following:
130. Id. at 13.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 17-18.
133. Id. at 18 (internal footnote omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 22. Southern officials also used this “weapon” against newspapers like the Times. Id.
136. 347 U.S. 483.
137. Brief for Petitioners at 20, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 40).
138. Id. at 22-26.
139. Id. at 20-21.
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Where Sullivan, a white public official, sued Negro petitioners represented by
Negro counsel before an all-white jury, in Montgomery, Alabama, on an advertise-
ment seeking to aid the cause of integration, the impact of courtroom segregation
could only denote the inferiority of Negroes and taint and infect all proceedings,
thereby denying petitioners the fair and impartial trial to which they are constitu-
tionally entitled.140
These violations of the Fourteenth Amendment were just one part of “Alabama’s
massive system of segregation.”141
Counsel continued with detail regarding certain racially charged particulars of the
trial. Again, counsel raised the matter of the pronunciation of Negro by plaintiff’s
counsel. The trial judge supposedly accepted the pronunciation because counsel told
the judge “that this was ‘the way respondent’s counsel had always pronounced it all
his life.’”142 Also, the jury pool did not contain any Black citizens.143 Furthermore,
Judge Jones had addressed White attorneys as “Mr.” while addressing Black attor-
neys as “Lawyer.”144 Although in a companion libel case and not the present case,
Jones had declared “that the Fourteenth Amendment was ‘a pariah[]’ and inappli-
cable in proceedings in Alabama State courts[,] which [were] governed by ‘white
man’s justice.’”145 Given this type of racially charged courtroom environment, coun-
sel argued, the ministers could not receive a fair trial.146
During the oral argument, race again received attention, although the familiar
First Amendment arguments also appeared. In terms of the First Amendment, Wil-
liam Rogers noted that the advertisement was about “a crucial public issue.”147 He
described the impact of the lower courts’ actions as “possibly[ ] the most serious
threat to free press in this country during this century.”148 Likewise, Samuel Pierce
touched on the encroachment of the ministers’ First Amendment rights.149
Nonetheless, race received plenty of attention. Not far into his oral argument,
Rogers pointed out “[t]hat the central fact of this case is that [the four ministers] are
being—drastically punished because they were Negroes residing in Alabama, who’ve
had the courage to speak out in the struggle to—to achieve the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution for all citizens regardless of race or color.”150 He added, “Indeed,
these petitioners, Dr. King and these four petitioners are the leaders of the civil rights
movement in Alabama.”151 The case had “as its purpose the intimidation of these
140. Id. at 53.
141. Id. at 52-53.
142. Id. at 55.
143. Id. at 56.
144. Id. at 55-56.
145. Id. 58-59.
146. Id. at 58.
147. Oral Argument at 41:28, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 40), available at http://
www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_39#40_argument.
148. Id. at 16:59.
149. Id. at 22:18.
150. Id. at 2:21.
151. Id. at 2:41.
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petitioners and others like them who speak o[ut] for equality and justice for the
Negro in Alabama.”152
Rogers followed by emphasizing the unfairness of Sullivan’s action against the
ministers. None of the ministers had prior knowledge of the advertisement and thus
could not have approved of it.153 Moreover, the letter that demanded retraction was
dated March 8, 1960, yet the letter referred to an item in the Times from March 29,
1960.154
In his portion of the oral argument, Pierce focused primarily on the unfairness of
the trial. Early in the argument, Pierce framed his clients’ position by stating, “The
sole purpose of this litigation is to suppress and punish expressions of support for the
course of racial equality and to try to keep those who are actively engaged in their
fight for civil rights, such as the petitioners in this case[,] from continuing to partici-
pate in that [struggle].”155
Pierce moved into a discussion of the trial, noting that “[t]his trial was conducted
in an atmosphere of racial bias, passion and hostile community pressures.”156 Specifi-
cally, he pointed to a record that referred to White lawyers as “Mr.” but referred to
Black lawyers as “Lawyer.”157 Although the stenographer had made these notations
in preparing the transcript, Pierce suggested that a stenographer normally “reflects
the attitude and the demeanor of the court and the customs and the usages of what
goes on in a place where the court is located.”158 Regardless, when Justice Brennan
asked Pierce if Jones had made these distinctions in addressing trial counsel, Pierce
responded affirmatively.159 Pierce also highlighted the alleged mispronunciation of
the word Negro by plaintiff’s counsel before the jury, as well as an inflammatory
reference in closing argument by plaintiff’s counsel about how Black people had
mistreated White people in the Congo.160
Pierce then transitioned into a discussion about the conduct of Jones in related
litigation. In the companion case of James v. Abernathy, Jones had said in open court
“that the Fourteenth Amendment was a pariah, an outcast[, and] that the case would
be tried in accordance with White men’s justice, not in accordance with the Four-
teenth Amendment.”161 Pierce continued, “He said, ‘I would like to say for those
here present and for those who may come here to litigate in the future that the
Fourteenth Amendment has no standing whatever in this Court . . . .’”162 When
Justice Black asked for the sources of the quotation, Pierce directed the native Ala-
baman to a piece in the Alabama Lawyer entitled “Judge Jones on Courtroom Segrega-
152. Id. at 14:32.
153. Id. at 7:56.
154. Id. at 10:55.
155. Id. at 21:59.
156. Id. at 22:34.
157. Id. at 22:51.
158. Id. at 23:31.
159. Id. at 23:58.
160. Id. at 24:31.
161. Id. at 26:33.
162. Id. at 26:53.
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tion.”163 Pierce also assured Black that the remarks were printed in the court record
for the James v. Abernathy case.164
Later in the argument, when Chief Justice Warren asked for the quotation again,
Pierce took the opportunity to press the point. The advocate quoted, “I would like to
say for those present and for those who may come here to litigate in the future, that
the Fourteenth Amendment has no standing whatever in this Court.”165 Pierce
added the following:
And it goes on and says, “A number of other things he ends up with, we will now
continue the trial of this case under the laws of the State of Alabama and not under
the Fourteenth Amendment and in the belief and knowledge that the White men’s
justice . . . [, a] justice born [of] long centuries in England, brought over to this
country by the Anglo-Saxon race and brought today to [its] full flower here, a
justice which has blessed countless generations of Whites and Blacks[,] will give the
parties of the bar of this Court regardless of race or color equal justice under
law.”166
To give context, Pierce delved into what had prompted the Jones remarks. The
advocate explained that many Black individuals had filled the courtroom over which
Jones was presiding.167 When Jones realized that the Black spectators were trying to
end segregation in his courtroom, he refused to accept the idea.168 Pierce quoted
Jones again, who had said, “‘The presence of this crowd of Negro spectators, occupy-
ing every seat from the front row to the back row of the courtroom is—is to test and
challenge the right and power of the presiding judge to direct the seating of spectators
in the courtroom.’”169 Jones had continued, “‘[S]pectators will be seated in this
courtroom according to their race[,] and this [is] for the orderly administration of
justice and the good of all people coming here lawfully.’”170
When Justice Black asked Pierce whether the record in Number 40 contained
anything like what had happened in James v. Abernathy, Pierce pointed out that, in
Number 40, trial counsel for the ministers had made objections about a segregated
courtroom.171 However, Jones had determined that the motions had lapsed.172 For
at least one motion, a motion for a new trial, only counsel for the Times, not for the
ministers, had appeared to obtain an adjournment.173 This was done in the interest
of efficiency.174 The matter of who had to appear to request the adjournment pre-
sented a question of underlying Alabama procedure for which no on-point cases and
163. Id. at 27:05.
164. Id. at 29:05.
165. Id. at 31:00.
166. Id. at 31:15.
167. Id. at 32:08.
168. Id. at 32:17.
169. Id. at 32:27.
170. Id. at 33:05.
171. Id. at 33:23.
172. Id. at 33:40.
173. Id. at 35:51.
174. Id. at 40:16.
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thus no clear answer existed.175 Nonetheless, technicalities of state procedure, Pierce
argued, should not trump fundamental federal constitutional rights.176
In rebuttal for the ministers, Rogers again mentioned the racial dimension to the
case. He asserted, “The fact of the matter is these petitioners are here today because
they’re Negroes and because they’ve been leaders in the fight for civil rights.”177 In
his final sentence of rebuttal, Rogers said, “And if this case should stand[,] . . . the
cause [of] . . . civil rights will be set back a great many years.”178
As the preceding discussion has shown, counsel for the ministers, in addition to
making First Amendment arguments, made extensive use of the racial dimension of
the case, which Wechsler and his colleagues did not do. The arguments regarding
race referred to both the racial problems in the specific case and also to those more
generally in the South. All of the noted problems illustrated how race had been used
to promote an ideology of White supremacy, and the racial discrimination that the
ministers had suffered at their trial demonstrated how race had been “‘a site of
struggle’” for them.179 Given the discrimination at the trial, the clients, and the
post-Brown Supreme Court, counsel’s approach was logical. Indeed, counsel’s clients
were African-American ministers intimately involved in the struggle for civil rights.
For example, Reverend Abernathy was a close confidant of Martin Luther King,180
and Reverend Shuttlesworth appeared at most of the major events during the Civil
Rights Movement.181 Furthermore, the audience of the rhetoric, the U.S. Supreme
Court, had been cautiously open to arguments about civil rights and race for a
number of years. Thus, the racially-focused arguments made strategic sense.
C. Race and the Advocacy for Sullivan
The Briefs for Respondent in Numbers 39 and 40 listed Robert E. Steiner III, Sam
Rice Baker, and M. Roland Nachman, Jr., as attorneys for Sullivan.182 Listed as of
counsel was Calvin Whitesell.183 At this stage, Nachman, who had been counsel for
Sullivan during both the trial and the appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, re-
mained in charge.184 As he had done before the Alabama Supreme Court, Nachman
presented oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court.185
175. Id. at 36:37.
176. Id. at 38:30.
177. Id. at 108:00.
178. Id. at 110:54.
179. Halualani et al., supra note 30, at 89 (observing how race can be used to promote a dominant
ideology); Flores, supra note 27, at 94.
180. Ralph David Abernathy, Rights Pioneer, Is Dead at 64, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 1990), http://www.
nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0311.html.
181. Matt Schudel, Fred L. Shuttlesworth, Courageous Civil Rights Fighter, Dies at 89, WASH. POST (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/fred-l-shuttlesworth-courageous-civil-rights-
fighter-dies-at-89/2011/10/05/gIQAO73lOL_story.html.
182. Briefs for Respondents at covers, New York Times v. Sullivan, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (Nos. 39 & 40).
183. Id.
184. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 47-48, 93, 128.
185. Id. at 153. Nachman had argued a case before the U.S. Supreme Court when he was only twenty-
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In the case against the Times, Nachman and his colleagues generally focused on
matters other than race. In the brief, when describing the advertisement, counsel
briefly mentioned some of the components of the struggle for civil rights in Alabama,
but counsel quickly dismissed the effort behind the advertisement as “a willful,
deliberate and reckless attempt to portray in a full-page newspaper advertisement, for
which the Times charged and was paid almost $5,000, rampant, vicious, terroristic
and criminal police action in Montgomery, Alabama, to a nationwide public of
650,000.”186 In terms of the brief’s legal argument, counsel claimed that the Consti-
tution did not provide absolute immunity to libel public officials.187 Counsel then
argued the Supreme Court had no basis for overturning the jury’s determinations on
damages or that the advertisement was of and concerning Sullivan.188 Additionally,
jurisdiction over the Times in Alabama was proper, counsel argued, because of the
contacts that the newspaper had with the state.189
Of particular note, counsel did hone in on race briefly. Counsel warned the Court
against going outside the record on Number 39, suggesting that the only reason the
Times would have the Court look at other libel cases was that the newspaper was
desperate.190 Along the same lines, counsel suggested that the Times wanted the
Court to elevate the legal protection for speech because racial problems were in-
volved.191 In effect, counsel implied, somewhat ironically since the brief was filed in
1963,192 the Times wanted to benefit from favoritism associated with the topic of
race.
During oral argument in the Times case, Nachman again focused on matters other
than race, including the traditional law of libel. Classical libel law matters such as
truth, libel per se, retraction, and association with the plaintiff filled his argument
time.193 Nachman argued that Sullivan had made a case for libel under Alabama law
and that the Times had not rebutted the case. In terms of the First Amendment,
Nachman said, “We—we think that the defendant in order to succeed must con-
vince this Court that a newspaper corporation has an absolute immunity from any-
thing it publishes.”194 Such a result, Nachman said, would be “something brand new
in our jurisprudence.”195
At one point early in the argument, Nachman did try to diminish the racial
dimension by distinguishing the stage in the proceeding below that was under re-
view. He pointed out, “We’re not here like in Norris on a question of whether a judge
seven. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 111. At that time, because Nachman had not been a member of the bar for
three years, he had needed to receive permission to argue the case before the Court. Id.
186. Brief for Respondent at 6-8, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39).
187. Id. at 29-38.
188. Id. at 40-51.
189. Id. at 59-63.
190. Id. at 52-53.
191. Id. at 54-55.
192. Id. at cover.
193. Oral Argument at 76:07, 84:57, 75:11 & 87:44, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(No. 39), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_39#argument.
194. Id. at 110:40.
195. Id. at 111:10.
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in a pretrial proceeding correctly decided the question of whether there was discrimi-
nation against Negroes in the selection of a grand jury panel.”196 Rather, Nachman
said, “We’re here after a jury trial with all that that means in terms of the Seventh
Amendment.”197 According to Nachman, racial discrimination mattered much less
if a jury had issued a verdict after a trial than if a judge had issued a pretrial ruling; the
composition of the jury pool that produced the jury seemingly was not an issue.
That Nachman and his colleagues made little of race in their brief and the oral
argument in the case against the Times is understandable because Wechsler and his
colleagues made little of race in their advocacy for the Times. Thus, Nachman and
colleagues had little need to respond to the race issue. Still, Nachman and colleagues
did argue against extra protection for speech associated with race, and Nachman later
deflected any concern regarding racial discrimination, noting that a jury had issued a
verdict.
In the case against the four ministers, counsel for Sullivan had much more of a
chance to address race and attempted to deflect the topic as inappropriate for discus-
sion. In the brief, Nachman and his colleagues presented a statement of facts that
pointed out that, in their own brief, the ministers were relying on matters from the
trial that technically were outside of the trial court record. For instance, Sullivan’s
counsel identified several matters outside of the trial court record that were only
raised when the case reached the Alabama Supreme Court. These matters, all of
which counsel designated as only “alleged,” included a racially segregated courtroom,
an “‘atmosphere of racial bias, passion and hostile community pressures,’” improper
media coverage of the trial, exclusion of Blacks from the jury pool, an unqualified
judge, and improper racial references in closing argument.198 Counsel maintained
that, if these matters had been raised at the trial court level, Sullivan would have
denied them.199
Additionally, counsel pointed to matters outside of the trial court record that were
not raised until the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court. These matters, some of
which counsel described as only “alleged,” or with words to that effect, included
references to White attorneys as “Mr.” and Black attorneys as “Lawyer,” the state-
ment about “‘white man’s justice,’” the racial composition of the jury, and the
various other pending libel suits.200 In terms of the title used for a lawyer, counsel
noted that the designation was that of the court reporter after the conclusion of the
trial.201 With regard to justice based on race, counsel highlighted the judge’s instruc-
tions to the jurors, in which the judge had said, “‘Please remember, gentlemen of the
jury, that all of the parties that stand here stand before you on equal footing and are
all equal at the Bar of Justice.’”202
196. Id. at 73:42.
197. Id. at 74:02.
198. Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 40).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 10-12.
201. Id. at 10.
202. Id. at 11.
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Counsel did point to one matter that was within the trial court record because the
matter had been raised before the trial court. This matter was the pronunciation of
the word Negro, but counsel noted that the matter was apparently resolved to the
ministers’ satisfaction.203 According to Nachman and colleagues, the judge had told
plaintiff’s counsel “to ‘read it just like it is.’”204
Later in the brief, Nachman and his colleagues focused on the ministers’ use of
race in the greater historical context, as opposed to in the trial context, as also outside
of the record and thus inappropriate for discussion. This additional material con-
sisted of “racial matters involving peonage, education, voting, housing and zoning,
public transportation, parks, libraries, petit and grand jury service, municipal bound-
aries, and reapportionment.”205 According to counsel, the historical context had no
impact on the case.
Characterizing virtually all of the above matters as outside the record of the trial
court proceedings,206 Nachman and his colleagues endeavored to deflect the racial
components of the case. In the argument section of the brief, counsel made reference
to what was then U.S. Supreme Court Rule 40(5), which prohibited “‘burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial, and scandalous matter.’”207 From the perspective of Nach-
man and his colleagues, all of the above items would be irrelevant and immaterial to
the case.208 Still, if one were to focus on other language from Supreme Court Rule
40(5), one might wonder whether the racial aspects of the case were too burdensome
and scandalous for counsel to address, as they often were for U.S. society at the time
and often have been since. Rather than dealing with the contextual complexities,
counsel wanted to deal only with a neatly sealed official record that was free of the
most complex social issue of the day, so counsel pushed that burdensome and scandal-
ous issue away under the rubric of legal technicality.
Although Nachman and colleagues did address matters of state libel law as they
applied to the ministers,209 more interesting for a study of race and rhetoric was how
counsel concluded the argument section of the brief. Quoting a commentator whom
the ministers had cited in their brief, counsel, urging responsible use of free speech,
asserted, “‘In the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, defamation was a major
weapon.’”210 Given the context of the case, counsel argued that African-American
ministers who had in the past criticized discriminatory laws and practices were akin
203. Id. at 13.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 17.
206. Referencing the Fourteenth Amendment issues that stemmed from racial discrimination, counsel
described as “too elemental for argument” the idea that the Supreme Court should avoid leaving the record to
address possible federal questions not raised in a timely manner based on state procedure. Id. at 18.
207. Id. at 17.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 19-24.
210. Id. at 24-25 (quoting David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 727, 728 (1942)). The ministers had stated the following: “There is a ‘need for protecting political
and economic criticism against intimidation by the libel laws.’” Brief for Petitioners at 35 n.22, Abernathy v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 40) (quoting David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and
Fair Comment II, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282, 1309 (1942)).
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to Nazis on the path to taking over Germany. This discourse also equated Southern
politicians like Sullivan with Jews and other minorities whom the Nazis had defamed
and later killed. Although the comparison would not have been perfect,211 given the
players in the case at bar, one would have thought that a rough comparison would
have been Blacks with Jews and Southern politicians with Nazis. Victims would
compare with victims, and oppressors would compare with oppressors. This Nazi-
referencing rhetoric was highly charged indeed. Also, since Sullivan’s counsel ob-
jected to the ministers’ reference to historical discrimination against Blacks in the
South, counsel’s reference to the Nazis, whose power had ended in the 1940s, was
ironic.
During the oral argument, as well as addressing the libel and First Amendment
aspects of the case,212 Nachman deflected concerns of race as he and his colleagues
had done in the brief. He continued to focus on the issue of matters not raised in the
trial court, describing some of those as “matters which don’t even relate remotely to
this case.”213 Nachman suggested that the race-based titles given the trial lawyers
were the court reporter’s designation and not that of the trial judge.214 When Chief
Justice Warren pressed Nachman on the issue, Nachman labored to show that the
judge’s use of titles was not racially discriminatory.215 For example, at one point
Nachman referenced a portion of the transcript where the trial judge, in reading a list
of lawyers’ names, had not used titles before the names of any of the White law-
yers.216 At another point, Nachman referenced a portion of the transcript where the
judge, again in reading a list of lawyers’ names, had referred to three White lawyers as
“Mr.” but had not used any title for another White lawyer.217
In reference to the motion for a new trial based on race and the Fourteenth
Amendment, Nachman insisted that the motion had lapsed.218 He concluded that,
without a continuance, “the matter [was] discontinued and dead as a matter of—of
211. As atrocious as Southern racism in the United States was, it would be hard to argue that the situation
in the South during the civil rights era was as bad for Blacks as the situation in Germany and its occupied
countries during the Nazi era was for Jews. During the Nazi era, Nazis and their collaborators killed approxi-
mately six million Jews, who accounted for almost two-thirds of all European Jews at the time. Introduction to
the Holocaust, UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?
ModuleId10005143 (last visited Dec. 8, 2014).
212. In one entertaining part of a discussion of whether the ministers should have denied that they had
endorsed the advertisement, Chief Justice Warren asked, “Mr. Nachman, it is not unknown to at least one
member of this Court that he receives letters from various parts of the country claiming that he has made
statements that are libelous on certain groups or certain individuals and demanding an apology for it. If that
member of the Court has made no such statements, is he under obligations to—to apologize or to deny that he
made any such statements at the peril of being sued for libel and having that offered as sufficient proof to get a
$500,000 verdict against him?” Oral Argument at 86:43, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No.
40), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_39#40_argument. When Nachman indi-
cated that he was not familiar with the contents of any such letter, Warren, causing laughter in the court,
replied with reference to the advertisement in the Times, “They’re far worse tha[n] this one.” Id. at 87:30.
213. Id. at 46:56.
214. Id. at 50:23.
215. Id. at 53:26.
216. Id. at 52:00.
217. Id. at 54:50.
218. Id. at 63:26.
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law and—and [could not] be revived by agreement of counsel.”219 Without this
viable motion, the ministers were unable to seek a less racially charged trial and were
faced with the $500,000 verdict against them and the Times. Like the claim that
certain matters were outside of the record, this argument about the lapsed motion
was a technical dodge that attempted to avoid any discussion of the burdensome and
scandalous issue of race.
When Nachman returned to some of the questions about the courtroom atmo-
sphere and the suitability of the judge to sit on the bench and to hear the case,
Nachman again tried to deflect any concerns about race. For example, he stated the
following:
But how the matters of—of the—of—of who was sitting where in a courtroom or
how a trial judge was elected or what a trial judge said three months after a trial and
those things could have been raised by the matters of—in the manner that—that—
that the petitioner[s] say they were raised as contrary to any known rule of
practice.220
Such matters were “complete afterthoughts” that had nothing to do with the record
of the case because they had not been raised in a timely manner.221
Nachman even ironically described these questions related to race as “smoke
screens.”222 Despite the actions of the authorities in Montgomery just before the
appearance of the Times advertisement, including allowing KKK members to attack
Alabama State College protesters,223 Nachman claimed, “This case should be heard
and we are confident it will be heard on its own merits.”224 Still, by arguing that the
case was in fact about libel, Nachman created his own smokescreen to prevent
the Supreme Court from seeing the racial and civil rights issues related to the
advertisement.
As the above discussion has shown, Nachman and his colleagues attempted to
deflect any serious discussion of race. Specifically, they argued that the ministers
should have objected to certain matters earlier in the history of the litigation or
should not have allowed some motions to lapse, apparently by having an entire group
of lawyers appear to ask the trial judge for a single continuance that would have
applied to all parties involved in the litigation. These rhetorical postures were
grounded in legal technicalities that, while offering hope for a public official client
whose case would not benefit from a discussion of contemporary racism, provided
little hope for improvement of race relations, the most thorny social issue of the
day.225 Indeed, counsel did what counsel had been hired to do—and no more.
219. Id. at 66:12.
220. Id. at 99:51.
221. Id. at 98:31.
222. Id. at 99:00.
223. See Section I, supra.
224. Oral Argument at 100:41, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 40), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_39#40_argument.
225. Lawyers usually focus on their clients’ cases and pay little attention to the larger social dynamics in
which those cases take place. See Marouf Hasian, Jr., Performative Law and the Maintenance of Interracial
Social Boundaries: Assuaging Antebellum Fears of “White Slavery” and the Case of Sally Miller/Salmone Mu¨ller,
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Although not made in the way they would be made in the future, the arguments of
Nachman and his colleagues against discussing race previewed later arguments against
discussing race. Decades after the heyday of the Civil Rights Movement, some advo-
cates would argue that there was no need to discuss race because society largely had
transcended the problems of race.226 In the absence of specifically seeing racism, one
could believe that the phenomenon no longer existed.227 Since the Civil Rights
Movement was continuing to unfold before their eyes, Nachman and his colleagues
could not credibly argue that U.S. society had transcended race in 1963 and 1964,
but, like future advocates disinterested in addressing the problems of race, Nachman
and his colleagues attempted to construct the subject as unsuitable for consideration.
VI. RACE IN THE OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Members of the Court used race differently in their respective opinions. In the
majority opinion, Justice Brennan did not put much attention on race, although his
application of the new federal rule of actual malice to the facts of the case suggested
that the majority was well aware of the racial dimension of the case. In contrast, in his
concurring opinion, Justice Black, the native Alabaman, explicitly described the
racial situation, making no attempt to be subtle about the racial dimension of the
case. Justice Goldberg touched on race explicitly, but in a much less detailed manner
than Justice Black.
A. Race and Justice Brennan’s Opinion for the Court
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan did not focus on race.228 In one
footnote, he recognized that “[t]he individual petitioners contend that . . . the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses were violated by racial segregation and racial
bias in the courtroom.”229 Nonetheless, he said, “Since we sustain the contentions of
all the petitioners under the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech
and of the press as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, we do not
decide the questions presented by the other claims of violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”230
Indeed, the opinion made much of the First Amendment. He focused intently on
political communication, quoting from case law to assert, “‘[I]t is a prized American
privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all
23 TEXT & PERFORMANCE Q. 55, 59-60 (2003) (considering this phenomenon of narrow thinking in an
academic law context).
226. Flores, Moon & Nakayama, supra note 34, at 183; HANEY LO´PEZ, supra note 44, at 143.
227. Flores, Moon & Nakayama, supra note 34, at 184. However, in “direct[ing] social, political, and legal
attention away from race and racism,” colorblindness can facilitate White privilege. Id. at 183-84.
228. Warren had chosen Brennan to write the opinion of the Court for several reasons. For instance,
Brennan had written on speech issues in several prior cases. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 164.
Additionally, Warren trusted Brennan, and the two men were in frequent agreement on how to resolve
cases. Id.
229. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 n.4.
230. Id.
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public institutions.’”231 Brennan called upon the famous discourse in which Justice
Louis Brandeis had stated, “‘Those who won our independence believed * * * that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle
of the American government.’”232 Brennan then added what would become a memo-
rable quotation and framed the case as the following: “Thus we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials.”233
Drawing upon Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, Brennan belatedly pushed
aside the infamous Sedition Action of 1798, which was representative of laws that
criminalized criticism of the government.234 Other famous authorities like Louis
Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Homes, and Zechariah Chafee provided Brennan with
additional support for condemning the Sedition Act and in turn providing
greater protection for political communication, “the central meaning of the First
Amendment.”235
Borrowing from the state courts, Brennan introduced to the realm of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence the idea of actual malice, which a government official who was a
libel plaintiff would have to show in addition to a common law case for libel.
According to Brennan, actual malice referred to knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for truth.236 This new doctrine complicated the case for the government
official who wished to sue his or her critics.
Rather than simply remanding the case, Brennan took the unusual step of review-
ing the evidence in the case. While the Times may have been negligent, it did not
demonstrate knowledge of falsity or recklessness, the justice concluded.237 Also, the
evidence was defective in showing that the advertisement was of and concerning
Sullivan.238 Meanwhile, the ministers had not known of any errors in the advertise-
ment, nor had they shown any recklessness.239 In both cases, the evidence of actual
malice was insufficient, so both lawsuits failed.
In light of the Warren Court’s history of supporting civil rights, albeit cautiously,
Brennan’s not explicitly addressing the racial aspects of the case in any detail might
have been somewhat ironic. In their advocacy, the ministers had asked the Court to
consider such aspects. One could argue that Nachman and his colleagues succeeded
231. Id. at 269 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)).
232. Id. at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 274-76. See Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
235. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276, 273. Although Brennan did not cite him, another thinker on freedom of
expression, Alexander Meiklejohn, had an influence on the Supreme Court. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965). In his
dissent, Black cited Meiklejohn’s work. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 297 n.6.
236. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. Brennan later regretted the term actual malice, thinking it confusing,
particularly for juries, who might associate the term with ill will. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 104, at 227.
237. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287-88.
238. Id. at 288.
239. Id. at 286. Brennan opined that the ministers’ case “require[d] little discussion.” Id.
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in deflecting the racial issue, but given the Court’s interest in civil rights, this out-
come was unlikely.
That Brennan and the rest of the Court recognized and were sensitive to the racial
dimension of the case, but handled this dimension of the case discretely, was more
likely. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court had experienced difficulty in getting
the Alabama Supreme Court to follow the former’s instructions. For example, after
Alabama had sued the NAACP in a case that involved disclosure of the organization’s
membership records, the Alabama Supreme Court several times had refused to coop-
erate with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions.240 Since the NAACP was a Black
organization that Alabama was suing in the 1950s, race was an obvious ingredient in
the case. Accordingly, Brennan most likely knew what would happen if he and his
colleagues remanded the Sullivan case to the Alabama court system for an application
of the new constitutional rule to the facts. Rather than giving the Alabama courts a
chance to maneuver around the actual malice rule,241 the U.S. Supreme Court
reviewed the evidence in the case. Given the way that the court system in Alabama
handled racial matters, Brennan’s opinion in Sullivan by implication recognized and
was sensitive to the racial dimension of the case. While Brennan has been described
as perhaps “the greatest judicial politician of his time,”242 one also could describe
him simply as a great politician, judicial or otherwise.
B. Race and the Concurring Opinions of Justices Black and Goldberg
Although Justice Brennan avoided an open discussion of race in the Court’s
opinion in Sullivan, Justice Black offered a much more explicit discussion of race in
his concurring opinion. Black, who was from a rural county in Alabama, had the
background to understand the issue from the perspective of a Southerner.243 Of
note, he had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan and had received support from the
KKK during his 1926 run for the U.S. Senate.244 How much Black supported the
KKK’s ideology during the 1920s may be hard to evaluate, but in a 1937 radio
address broadcast nationally, Black insisted that he had resigned his membership in
the KKK.245 Responding to charges that he was “‘prejudiced against people of the
Jewish and Catholic faiths, and against members of the Negro race,’” Black insisted
that he “was of that group of liberal senators who have consistently fought for the
civil, economic, and religious rights of all Americans, without regard to race or
240. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 90-92. See, e.g., National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE 105-09
(1995) (offering context for the litigation from the perspective of NAACP counsel).
241. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 178; STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 104, at 225.
242. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 12, at 166 (observing how Brennan would write and re-write opinions
to secure the votes of his colleagues).
243. SCHWARTZ, supra note 80, at 32.
244. Martı´n Carcasson & James Arnt Aune, Klansman on the Court: Justice Hugo Black’s 1937 Radio
Address to the Nation, 89 Q. J. SPEECH 154, 155-56 (2003).
245. Id. at 158-59. This speech attracted the second largest radio audience of the 1930s. Id. at 156. Only
the abdication speech of the United Kingdom’s Edward VIII drew a larger radio audience during the decade.
Id. at 168 n.17.
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creed.”246 Whatever Black’s motivations for joining the KKK, he understood the
dynamics of race in the South.
In his opinion, Black argued for an absolutist perspective on protection for sedi-
tious libel,247 and he placed this perspective in the context of the civil rights era. He
described the case as one with “racial overtones.”248 He spoke of the financial threat
of libel suits to a free press that was covering the segregation of the day.249 Black
observed the following:
One of the acute and highly emotional issues in this country arises out of efforts of
many people, even including some public officials, to continue state-commanded
segregation of races in the public schools and other public places, despite our
several holdings that such a state practice is forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment.250
He added that Montgomery was one location in which this discrimination contin-
ued to occur.251 Those who advocated for desegregation, including “‘outside agita-
tors’” like the Times, often experienced hostility from supporters of segregation, and
in this case, given the lack of a showing of any real harm to Sullivan’s reputation,
such hostility contributed as much to the verdict as did an assessment of damages.252
Black even ventured to claim that the advertisement probably enhanced Sullivan’s
reputation.253
Although he most likely did not need to hear the ministers’ arguments to under-
stand the situation, Black borrowed aspects of the ministers’ arguments regarding
race.254 While Black did not address many of the alleged equal protection violations,
he accepted the idea that race was a key ingredient in the case. Black’s concurring
opinion in Sullivan drew attention to the underlying racial issues of the case, which
Nachman and their colleagues had been trying to deflect, and Black’s approach
supported opening the door for the press to criticize practices of racial discrimination
in the South.
246. Id. at 159.
247. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (Black, J., concurring). Black stated “that the Times
and the individual defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times
advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials.” Id.
248. Id. at 295. Black noted that in Alabama there presently were eleven libel suits against the Times and
five against CBS. Id.





254. Black, who joined the Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education and various other similar cases,
paid a price for supporting the Warren Court’s concern for civil rights. Indeed, many White Alabamans
believed that Black had betrayed them. Debbie Elliott, A Life of Justice: “Hugo Black of Alabama”, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Sept. 11, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId4828849. For many years,
Black did not make public appearances in Alabama. Id.
Despite the animosity that many Alabamans had developed for Black during his tenure on the Supreme
Court, when he returned home and gave a speech in 1970, he declared, “‘I love Alabama. I love the
South . . . So far as I know not a single ancestor that I ever had settled north of the Mason & Dixon line. They
were all Southerners. And so, I am a Southerner.’” Id.
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Also taking an absolutist perspective on protection for seditious libel, Justice
Goldberg concurred as well.255 In his opinion, he touched on race, although much
less so than Black. Goldberg declared, “The opinion of the Court conclusively demon-
strates the chilling effect of the Alabama libel laws on First Amendment freedoms in
the area of race relations.”256 Although he did not develop the concept, Goldberg put
it on the table in an explicit manner and offered an addendum to the discussion of
race in Black’s opinion.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has illustrated the various rhetorical choices regarding race that advo-
cates made in their merits briefs and oral arguments in the landmark New York Times
v. Sullivan case, as well as how the justices employed race in their various opinions in
the case. In terms of the attorneys’ advocacy, counsel for the Times focused on the
First Amendment instead of race. Meanwhile, counsel for the ministers, as well as
making the First Amendment arguments, presented a vision of a case saturated with
multiple acts of racism best understood from a perspective that considered the long-
standing history of racial discrimination in the South. Finally, via legal technicalities
such as objecting to the use of virtually anything outside of a neatly sealed trial court
record, counsel for Sullivan tried to deflect any serious discussion of race.
In terms of the judicial rhetorics, Brennan, writing for the Court, declined to focus
on race and instead chose to focus on the First Amendment. However, Brennan
applied the new rule of federal constitutional actual malice to the facts of the case and
prevented resistance from the racially charged Alabama court system. In his concur-
rence, Black offered an explicit discussion of the racial context for the case. Goldberg
raised the issue of race as well, albeit much more briefly than Black.
Accordingly, through analysis of the discourses in Sullivan, this Article has offered
a better understanding of rhetorical management of a volatile topic like race at the
appellate level. The Article has addressed several rhetorical choices available to advo-
cates, including employing alternative arguments, developing the controversial topic
in depth, or deflecting that topic. Additionally, the Article has shown how members
of an appellate bench can deal with a challenging topic subtly or more explicitly.
Of course, in Sullivan, the Fourteenth Amendment was not the only part of the
Constitution at issue since the First Amendment was a major part of the case as well.
In Fourteenth Amendment cases, such as those that involve the constitutionality of
programs like affirmative action,257 race may be the only major topic on the table,
and subtle discussions would be harder to develop. Examination of the rhetorics of
such cases may be fruitful in developing a better understanding of appellate dis-
courses that attempt to manage explosive topics.
Despite the efforts of Nachman and his colleagues, Sullivan officially turned out to
255. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
256. Id. at 300-01.
257. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); and
Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. __ (2013).
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be a First Amendment case. Wechsler, his colleagues, and counsel for the ministers
all argued in favor of an expansion of the First Amendment to cover libel law. These
arguments succeeded, and, at least outside of the South, there was “‘dancing in the
streets.’”258 Nonetheless, the ministers’ arguments that drew attention to race ap-
peared, to one degree or another, in all of the justices’ opinions, although in the
majority opinion only subtly and in the concurring opinions less fully than in the
briefing and during oral argument. Regardless of whether the justices embraced each
of the ministers’ arguments, the advocacy in general proved successful and served the
ministers’ ends. Like other critics, members of the Civil Rights Movement would
have greater “‘breathing space’”259 in which to speak their minds on the government
and its policies.
258. Kalven, supra note 7, at 221 n.125 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn).
259. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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